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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
ST ATE OF GEORGIA

TARA SCOTT; BAILEY M. CARTER; and
WILSON CARTER. Individually, as Trustee
of THE WILSON M. CARTER 1988
TRUST, and as Next Friend of MARY
WILSON CARTER,
Plaintiffs.
V.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action
File No. 2017CV297083

Bus. Case Div. 2

)

JOHN J. CARR and
JOHN MATTHEW DWYER,
Defendants.

)
)

rn,

)
)
)

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS
The above styled matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Defendant
John J. Carr's Counterclaims ("Motion to Dismiss"). Having considered the pleadings, the Court
finds as follows:
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT PLEADINGS
In this action Plaintiffs allege Defendants John J. Carr and John Matthew Dwyer violated
state and federal securities laws and conunitted other torts when they solicited and sold Plaintiffs
shares in Vantage Corporation ("Vru1tage"). Plaintiffs assert that at the time they were sold the
Vantage shares: the stock was not a federal covered security, was not subject to an effective
registration statement and was not exempt from registration; Defendants received direct or
indirect compensation for their role in soliciting investments in Vantage but were not registered
as securities salespeople or as investment advisors; and Defendants made misleading statements

of material fact or omissions when soliciting and selling shares to Plaintiffs causing Plaintiffs to
suffer damages.
In his answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, filed Aug. 13, 2018, Defendant
Carr asserts a counterclaim against Plaintiffs Tara Scott and Wilson Carter that includes claims
for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The breach of contract claim is specifically
directed against Scott. Carr asserts that on Oct. 24, 2016, Scott executed a Stock Transfer, Power
of Attorney to Transfer Stock and Release Agreement ("Stock Transfer Agreement").' Therein
Scott assigned and transferred to David F. Lawrence 119.240675 shares of her Vantage stock and
appointed the President of Vantage to transfer the stock on the company's books. Carr contends
Scott breached a release provision contained in the Stock Transfer Agreement by filing this
action against him.
With respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, Carr previously asserted that, to the
extent the Court finds the parties agreed to be partners, Scott and Carter breached their fiduciary
duties and implied covenants of good faith, fair dealing, and loyalty by: failing to disclose
information and not providing accurate information; not acting in Carr and the partnership's best
interests; making misrepresentations and omissions of facts and events; and misusing superior
knowledge, among other allegations. However, in his Second Amended Answer to Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, filed on Oct. 29, 2018, Carr abandoned the
breach of fiduciary duty claim, leaving only the breach of contract claim against Scott.

Defendant John J. Carr's Second Amended Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and
Counterclaim, Ex. K (Stock Transfer Agreement). See Hendon Properties, LLC v. Cinema Dev., LLC, 275 Ga. App.
434. 435, 620 S.£.2d 644, 647 (2005) ("[A] trial court may properly consider exhibits attached to and incorporated
in the pleadings in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief') (citing Bakhtiarnejad v.
Cox Enterprises. 247 Ga. App. 205, 208(1). 541 S.E.2d 33 (2000)).

2

ANALYSIS
I.

Standard on a Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss brought under O.C.G.A. §9-l l-12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless:
(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the
claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable
facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that
the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the
framework of the complaint sufficient to wan-ant a grant of the
relief sought. ..
Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 774-75, 755 S.E.2d 796, 798-99 (2014) (citing Anderson v. Flake,
267 Ga. 498, 501(2). 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997)); Abramyan v. State, 301 Ga. 308. 309, 800 S.E.2d
366, 368 (2017), reconsideration denied (June 5, 2017). "When the sufficiency of the complaint
is questioned by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted,
the rules require that it be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with all doubts
resolved in his favor even though unfavorable constructions are possible." Cobb Cty. v. Jones
Grp. P.L.C., 218 Ga. App. 149,152,460 S.E.2d 516,520 (1995) (citing Time Ins. Co. v. FultonDeKalb Hosp. Auth., 211 Ga. App. 34, 35,438 S.E.2d 149 (1993)).
II.

Analysis and Conclusions of Law
A. Breach of Contract Claim
ln his counterclaim Carr alleges Scott breached the Stock Transfer Agreement by filing

this action against him in violation of the release contained in the agreement. Plaintiffs urge Carr
fails to state a claim for breach of contract because the Stock Transfer Agreement only
concerned the 119.240675 Vantage shares she transferred thereunder, not the remaining shares of
Vantage stock she continues to own and which are the subject of her clai.ms in this action and, iJ1
particular, her prayer for rescission.
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In Georgia,
[a] release or settlement agreement is a contract subject to construction by
the court. It is governed by state law applicable to contracts in general.
The cardinal rule of construction is to determine the intention of the
parties. Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous,
the court will look to the contract alone to find the intention of the parties.
Such a contract is the only evidence of what the parties intended and
understood by it.
Tisdale v. Westmoore Grp., LLC, 341 Ga. App. 445, 448, 800 S.E.2d 624, 627-28 (2017)
(quoting Unffund Financial Corp. v. Donaghue, 288 Ga. App. 81, 82, 653 S.E.2d 5 I 3 (2007).

See also Kinard v. Worldcom. Jnc., 232 Ga. App. 278, 279, 500 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1998) (''It is
well established that where the terms of a written release are clear and unambiguous, the court
wi 11 look to the release alone to find the intention of the parties"). "The fact that the scope of the
[release] is broad does not make [it] ambiguous." Rice v. Huft~ 221 Ga. App. 592, 593, 472
S.E.2d 140,142 (]996) (citing Citadel Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp .. 212 Ga. App. 875, 876(2), 443
S.E.2d 489 (1994)).
Here, the Stock Transfer Agreement identifies and defines the subject "Shares" as
119.240675 shares of the Class_ Common Stock, $.0001 par value, of Vantage Corporation
standing in Transferor Tara M. Scott's name on Vantage's books represented by Certificate No.
2

A-0020. The Stock Transfer Agreement includes a release that provides in part:
For and in consideration of the promises, covenants, and warranties
contained herein ... [Tara M. Scott] does hereby release, rernise, acquit and
forever discharge (Vantage Corporation] and each of [Vantage
Corporationj's successors, assigns, affiliates, and their respective past
and present officers, directors, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys
(the "Releasees"), from any and all rights, demands, claims, damages,
losses, costs, expenses, actions and causes of action whatsoever, including
but not limited to claims arising under the Shares, including claims in
tort or in contract, at law or in equity, known or unknown, contingent or
fixed, suspected or unsuspected. [Tara M. Scott] understands and agrees
that by signing this agreement [she] is giving up rights, if any, which
2
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[size] may have under federal, state, or municipal law, and is hereby
covenanting not to file complaints or lawsuits or to assert any claims

against Releasees arising thereunder.
(Emphasis added).
The Court finds the Stock Transfer Agreement did not simply release claims related to
the transferred Shares as asserted by Plaintiffs. Notably, the release language does not contain
any limitations narrowing the scope or the specific types of claims being released. Rather, Scott
released "any and all" rights, claims, actions, and causes of action, including "but not limited to"
the transferred Shares. Given this broad but unambiguous language, Carr has at least stated a
claim for breach of Stock Transfer Agreement. Thus, Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Carr's breach
of contract counterclaim is hereby DENIED.
B. Attorney's Fees and Litigation Expenses Related to Breach of Contract Claim
Plaintiffs also urge that Carr fails to state a claim for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation with respect to the breach of contract counterclaim because the Stock Transfer
Agreement does not include any provision for the recovery of such fees and Carr has not
specially pied the statutory grounds for the recovery of attorney's fees and expenses under
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. In response, Carr acknowledges there is no Georgia authority specifically
holding that attorney's fees and litigation expenses are necessarily recoverable as damages for
breach of a release agreement and notes the split in authority among other jurisdictions on this
issue. See Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Premium Fin .. LLC, 904 F.3d 1197,
1225 (11th Cir. 2018) ("In at least some jurisdictions, an action filed in violation of a contract
not to sue may under certain circumstances-which vary by jurisdiction-permit a suit for
breach, with the measure of damages usually being the attorney's fees and costs incurred in
defending against the claim that was precluded"; collecting cases from jurisdictions that allow
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such claims and others that "take a different approach"). However, Carr argues Scott's breach of
the Stock Transfer Agreement has caused him to incur attorney's fees and litigation expenses in
defense thereof and, thus are "part and parcel" of the damages required to compensate him for
Scott's breach of the agreement. The Court is not persuaded.
"The general rule in our legal system is that 'parties are responsible for their own
attorney fees and that an award of fees is an exception to this rule." Pipe Sols., Inc. v. Inglis, 291
Ga. App. 328, 329, 661 S.E.2d 683, 685 (2008) (citing Dept. of Transp. v. Ga. Television
Co., 244 Ga. App. 750, 753(1) 536 S.E.2d 773 (2000)). Indeed under Georgia law "[t)he
expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the damages" in a lawsuit.
O.C.G.A. § I 3-6-1 I (emphasis added). Thus, it is well settled that '·[i)n Georgia, 'attorney fees
are not generally recoverable as damages absent an express provision in a contract or a statutory
mandate."' Doss & Assocs. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 325 Ga. App. 448, 464, 754 S.E.2d 85, 98
(2013) (quoting George L. Smith. etc. v. Miller Brewing Co .. 255 Ga. App. 643. 644, 566 S.E.2d
361 (2002)) (emphasis in original). See Georgia Subsequent Injury Tr. Fund v. Muscogee Iron
Works, 265 Ga. 790,790,462 S.E.2d 367,368 (1995); Money v. Thompson & Green Mach. Co.,
155 Ga. App. 566, 566, 271 S.E.2d 699, 700 (1980); Bowers v. Fulton Ctv., 227 Ga. 814,815,
183 S.E.2d 347, 347-48 (1971); Bankers Fid. Life ins. Co. v. Oliver, 106 Ga. App. 305,307, 126
S.E.2d 887,890 (1962). See also
Given the above binding authorities. insofar as the Stock Transfer Agreement does not
contain any provision expressly authorizing the recovery of attorney's fees and litigation
expenses for breach of the agreement, and whereas Carr has not pied any statutory basis or other
binding legal authority which would permit the recovery of same, any claim for such fees and
expenses as a measure of Carr s damages is hereby DISMISSED.
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C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Insofar as Carr amended his counterclaim to withdraw the cause of action against Scott
and Carter for breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss that claim is hereby
DENIED as moot.
III.

Conclusion

Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Defendant John J. Carr's Counterclaims 1s hereby
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above.
SO ORDERED this

9~

day of November, 2018.

-I E. LONG, ·SENI
Fulton Cou ty Superior Court
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Served upon registered service contact through eFileGA:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

~'

S. Lawrence Polk
EVERSHEDSSUTHERLAND(US)LLP
999 .Peachtree Street, NE
Suite 2300
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3996
Tel: (404) 853-8000
Fax: (404) 853-8806
I arrypo I k@,evcrsheds-sut her land .com

Attorneys for Defendants
David M. Mondc
Michael J. McConnell
Janine Cone Metcalf
Kaelcy R. Brown
JONES DAY
1420 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Suite 800
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3053
Tel: (404) 581-3939
Fax: ( 404) 581-8330
dmmonde(@jonesday.com
mm econ nel l@.j onesday .com
jmetcalf@jonesdav.com
krbrown(@.jonesdav.com

Counsel for Defendant John J Carr
James D. Blitch IV
BLITCH LAW, P.C.
191 Peachtree Street. NE
Suite 3285
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1740
Tel: (404) 221-0401
fax: (404) 221-0402
jim@bl itch law.com

Counselfor Defendant Matthew Dwyer, fl!
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